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**THE ROLE OF THE CINC IN  
THE DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROCESS**

**by**

**William H. Jackson**

**Lt. Col, USAF**

**A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY**

**IN**

**FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM**

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# **DISCLAIMER**

The views and opinions contained in this paper, "The Role of The CINC in the Defense Resource Allocation Process" are solely those of the author, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Jackson, USAF. They are in no way to be construed as the views and opinions of either the Air Force or the Air War College.

## **ABSTRACT**

**TITLE:** "The Role Of The CINC in the Defense Resource Allocation Process"

**AUTHOR:** William H. Jackson, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

The CINCs are the commanders who will be called upon to prosecute any military action within the spectrum of conflict, from low-intensity to total war. Therefore, the CINCs role in threat determination and prosecution of military action requires considerable focus. But do these potential combatant commanders, with enormous responsibility, have corresponding authority and control over the defense resource allocation process to meet their requirements and needs?

## INTRODUCTION

In peacetime, each of the Armed Services has the responsibility to train, equip, and organize interoperable forces for assignment to the unified Commanders-in-Chief (CINC) in time of war.<sup>1</sup> When war comes, as planned for in a specific family of war plans or a situation dictates military involvement not planned for, each tasked service will provide to the CINC's theater their separate people, equipment, organization and logistical system. It then becomes incumbent upon that respective CINC to exercise command over and responsibility for these separate service components.<sup>2</sup> Because the CINCs only exercise directive control over the resources, of the individual services, when they are employed, the warfighter must depend on the services to maximize the defense resources allocation in peacetime. With continually decreasing budgets the services and the CINCs can no longer expect on-the-shelf resources to meet all military exigencies.

Our nation's military structure has evolved over time to the point where threat determination by the CINCs is central to the defense resource allocation process.<sup>3</sup> The development of sound strategy and concepts at the operational level depend on the CINCs ability to ascertain the threat.<sup>4</sup> If the CINC fails in threat analysis there is virtually no hope of maximizing the defense resource allocation process.

Threats may change, but our vital interest remain constant:<sup>5</sup> survival of the homeland; favorable world order; promotion of American values; and our economic well-being. National security objectives are necessary to achieve and maintain these vital interests. Vital interests are articulated in policy, action, and strategy. In today's environment it is often the CINC who is called upon to execute US action, policy, and strategy.<sup>6</sup>

The CINCs are the commanders who will be called upon to execute any military action within the spectrum of conflict, from low-intensity to total war.<sup>7</sup> Therefore, the CINCs role in threat determination and execution of military action requires considerable focus. But do these potential combatant commanders, with enormous responsibility, have corresponding authority and control over the defense resource allocation process to meet their requirements and needs?

The defense resource allocation process is an intricate decision making system encompassing many factors in dynamic combinations. The end product of this process is the determination of what resources will be dedicated to support the vital interests of the United States. Until the mid 1980's the CINCs' role in the defense resource allocation process was not as influential as many thought it should be.<sup>8</sup> A letter from Admiral William Crowe, at the time Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command (USCINCPAC) in August 1984 summarizes this belief, "...I'm aware of



several instances where the Services, without consulting me, have made major decisions affecting my ability to execute USPACOM strategy. I learned about them after the fact during the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) deliberations or in the media. It was too late then for me to have any serious influence on these issues. In essence, the Services' decisions have torqued or redirected my strategy oftentimes in an operational vacuum. While this may not have been the intent, the result was the same nonetheless."<sup>9</sup>

One of the most difficult tasks facing our national leadership is deciding how much to spend on defense. Even during the Cold War when there was clearly a perceived threat to vital interests the choice between defense and non-defense resources was difficult.<sup>10</sup> For the United States in the post-Cold War period, the choices on defense resource allocation are going to be more difficult. By examining some of the dynamics and complexity of the defense resource allocation process it is possible to understand the fragility of the process. For all its formality it is a system designed by a democratic nation which is in effect the results of the elected, appointed, and government servants of that nation. For the most part, the populous gets what they ask for through these individuals.<sup>11</sup>

The defense resource allocation process involves many factors including the federal budget, weapons systems acquisition, joint federal budget, joint planning, and domestic political issues.<sup>12</sup> It would be virtually

impossible to thoroughly examine each of these parts in this paper. Because the process is so encompassing presentation of a model assists in understanding.(fig 1) It can be contended that the Biennial Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (BPPBS) is the center of the defense resource allocation process.<sup>13</sup> The Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) is vital to the defense resource allocation process because it is the means by which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides input into the services to generate the BPPBS.<sup>14</sup>

Definition of a threat has traditionally driven the national strategy which consequently drives the military strategy and the JSPS, which in turn creates the BPPBS.<sup>15</sup> During the Cold War there was a consistently agreed upon threat to our vital national interest and the resource allocation process ran relatively straightforward.<sup>16</sup> The Cold War is over and there is no longer a consistent well-defined threat.<sup>17</sup>

Military strategic decisions, based on determined threats, drive what kind of forces we need to execute our national strategy. This part of the decision process is called "force planning" : what kind and how many divisions, wings, aircraft carrier battle groups do we need to insure our national security objectives. Resources cost money and are finite. The services must compete for these limited resources. But the objective is not to compete, the objective is to develop a force which is both capable and

# Defense Resource Allocation Process




Figure 1

affordable. Therefore, resources must be prudently allocated. This becomes not only a matter of amount of resources but the application of the resources. The development of concise military strategy assures that the national strategy can be executed. If the resources are not coupled with sound plans and concepts, objectives cannot be achieved. In future conflicts a properly assessed threat will be essential to the development of sound military strategy. The individual most often called upon to develop military strategy in the face of a threat is the CINC.<sup>18</sup>

This paper will examine the defense resource allocation process by looking at the BPPBS and the JSPS. Second, a look at our old Cold War enemy and the significance of the Soviet Union to the defense resource allocation process is appropriate. Then, an example will be given of how a CINC is able to concentrate resources with plans and concepts to achieve a stated objective. Finally, the question of whether the CINCs need increased authority in the resources allocation process will be addressed. What must be remembered throughout this paper is that in an era of constrained resources, efficiency has become critical and the mission of the armed services, as a whole, needs to be maximization of that efficiency to meet the needs of the combatant commanders (CINCs).

**THE BIENNIAL PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGET PROCESS  
(BPPBS) AND THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS (JSPS)**

The *purpose* of the BPPBS is to produce a plan, a program, and finally a budget for the Department of Defense (DOD).<sup>19</sup> The budget is forwarded to the president for his approval. The Presidents Budget (PB) is submitted to congress for authorization and appropriation. The *objective* of the BPPBS is to provide the CINC's the best possible forces, equipment, and support within fiscal constraints.<sup>20</sup>

The system within the BPPBS system which is used to furnish the CINCs their missions, forces, equipment, and support is the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).<sup>21</sup> The JSPS is the formal review of the national security environment and the national security objectives, threat evaluation, assessment of current strategy and existing or proposed programs and budgets, military strategies and forces necessary to achieve national security objectives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).<sup>22</sup> The JSPS along with the BPPBS are interrelated systems designed to provide the warfighter with tools to accomplish military strategy.<sup>23</sup>

The BPPBS is a three phase process. (fig 2) The first P is for the Planning Phase. It is here that the threats facing the nation for the next 5-20 years are identified. Our capability to counter those threats are assessed and the forces necessary to defeat them are recommended. The JSPS is used to develop the Planning Phase.<sup>24</sup>


# Phases of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting

## **Budgeting:**

- Express Programs as funding requirements

## **Planning:**

- Assess threat & risk
- Articulate strategies
- Force requirements



## **Programming:**

- Translate strategies to programs
- Reconcile objectives and means

**Figure 2**

The second P is for the Programming Phase. It is here the services match available dollars against critical needs and develop a five year resources proposal, the (FYDP). It is in the Programming Phase that fiscal, manpower, and material requirements are matched with available resources. This data base becomes the basis for budgeting action. The inputs from the warfighting CINCs are supposed to drive the specific services in their deliberations and decisions.<sup>25</sup>

The B is for the Budgeting Phase. It is here that the detailed costs are refined and the individual services develop the financial estimates to accomplish the approved programs.<sup>26</sup>

The JSPS is how the Chairman of the Joint Chief's of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) discharge their strategic planning responsibilities.<sup>27</sup> The CJCS is by law the President's, Secretary of Defense's, (SECDEF's) and National Security Council's (NSC's) principal military advisor.<sup>28</sup> The JCS develop military strategy, force planning, mission definition, and assess program decisions. The CINCs provide their inputs for the JSPS through their respective service and the CJCS.<sup>29</sup>

Within the JSPS there is a process for gathering information, examining current, emerging, and future issues, threat technologies, organizations, doctrinal concepts, force structure, and military missions.<sup>30</sup> The Military Service Chiefs are tasked to train, organize, and equip the forces for the CINCs. The Chiefs do this through their role

in the resource allocation process, which is to actually exercise the BPPBS and build the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for submission to the SECDEF.<sup>31</sup> The POM is the military departments total resource requirements within the parameters of the published SECDEF guidance.<sup>32</sup>

The link between the BPPBS and the JSPS is the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).<sup>33</sup> The DPG is the SECDEF's guidance to the military departments when they cycle. The DPG includes major planning issues, and decisions, strategy and policy, strategic elements, the secretaries program for planning objectives, the Defense Planning Estimate, the Illustrated Planning Scenarios (IPLs) from the CINCs and whatever else is required. The individual services need the DPG to develop the POM.<sup>34</sup>

Once the POM is developed it proceeds from each of the separate services to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (ASD(C)) and it becomes the Budget Estimate Submission (BES).<sup>35</sup> The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Office of Budget and Management (OMB) conduct hearings to review the BES. If at the end of the BPPBS process OMB or DOD believes that unresolved issues remain, the SECDEF, or the director of OMB may raise these issues with the President. Once the final budget decisions are made the DOD budget becomes part of the overall President's Budget and is submitted to Congress. When the President signs Congressional appropriations act into law, OMB apportions funds to the service departments.<sup>36</sup> The



Service's execute the budget and provide forces/capabilities and the CINCs develop, maintain, and prepare to execute their war plans.<sup>37</sup> So the CINC is obligated to provide input to begin the joint planning process and is responsible for execution of the plan at the end of the process.<sup>38</sup> The CINCs are also responsible for presenting their Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) into the programmatic portion of the POM.<sup>39</sup> These IPLs rank the respective CINC's critical warfighting requirements, highlighting issues which require SECDEF attention and point out those key service and DOD program which affect their theater of operation. The IPLs go directly to the SECDEF and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff.<sup>40</sup>

## HISTORY OF THE BPPBS AND JSPS

President Kennedy's SECDEF, Robert McNamara developed the PPBS in the early 1960's.<sup>41</sup> It evolved from a RAND study on how to allocate resources in a more rational systematic method.<sup>42</sup> It was aimed at directly relating mission requirements with assets. Previous to the PPBS each service established its own budget with little guidance from the SECDEF.<sup>43</sup> Services were given their "share" of the pie, and a ceiling was put on that share, which could be arbitrary raised or lowered. One of the overarching aspects of the PPBS was the creation of the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP) which is normally referred to as the Program Objective Memorandum (POM).<sup>44</sup>

The PPBS has seen many modifications since its beginning. Under SECDEF Harold Brown the Rice Study added the Defense Resources Board.<sup>45</sup> SECDEF Casper Weinburger became the first to direct the CINC's to submit a clearly identified requirements plan for new or changes to programs through their service components. In addition Weinburger began the practice of requiring CINC's to prepare higher priority needs (war stoppers) in the areas of readiness and sustainability. These were submitted directly to the Dep SECDEF and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instead of through individual services.<sup>46</sup>

In 1952, Joint Chiefs of Staff established the Joint Strategic Planning Process (JSPS). Since then the system

has had 16 revisions to refine the ability to discharge their strategic planning responsibilities and make a substantive contribution to the defense budgeting and war planning process.<sup>47</sup> The JSPS should drive mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces in the near-term and can not program forces for missions in the mid-term.<sup>48</sup> The JSPS is the basis for formulating the nation's *military strategy, resource needs and operational plans*.

## GOLDWATER-NICHOLS ACT

The greatest change to the defense resource allocation process and especially the acquisition portion of the process was the Goldwater Nichols Bill in 1986. This Bill is known as the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The *theme* of the Bill was a push for "jointness" and interservice cooperation was the *underlying theme*<sup>9</sup> of the JCS reform. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 was meant to change the way the DOD did business. The news release stated the new law would be "the most far-reaching reorganization of the United States defense establishment in almost 30 years." The Bill would focus on the joint functions of defense and would "overcome the weak interservice cooperation that has hampered our military operations from the Spanish-American War to the operation in Grenada."<sup>30</sup>

This act opened the door for strengthening the JCS and the role of the unified and specified commands. The Act clearly states that the operational chain of command runs from the President to the SECDEF to the combatant commanders, the CINCs.<sup>31</sup> It is this act which made the CJSC the president's, SECDEF's and National Security Council's principal military advisor.<sup>32</sup>

Shortly after the Goldwater-Nichols Act, DOD directive 5100.1 (Sep. 25 1987) was issued. This document required the JCS and the services to address the budget and

acquisition with the CINCs. The central change to the directives was that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would "advise the SECDEF on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the Military Departments and other components of the DOD conform with the priorities established in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Combatant Commands." 33

## **PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SYSTEM**

Because the Program Objective Memorandum is based on the concepts and guidance in the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) the need for clarity in that document cannot be underestimated. The DPG must be representative of what the nation views as threats to vital interest and objectives. If the DPG can accurately interpret threats to the US, the BPPBS can provide the resources to meet that threat. If the SECDEF is not given clear indication of the threat, the task of developing the DPG becomes complicated. It is through the CINCs planning process that the SECDEF can often gain the required clarity.

Definition of a threat has traditionally determined the national strategy and that drives the military strategy which, as stated earlier, has as one of its products the BPPBS.<sup>34</sup> Because there was a consistently agreed upon threat to our vital national interest the process ran relatively straightforward. Since 1947 our belief that the goal of Soviet Communism was to spread, drove our decision making process and therefore the defense resource allocation process. We developed a national policy to *contain* communism at any cost. It was in our best interest to contain communism through the defense resource allocation process. One major product of this was the development of a

military strategy to contain communism through "nuclear deterrence".<sup>35</sup>

As time went on that military strategy included *forward presence through deployment of forces, maintaining a nuclear triad, sufficient basing and logistical capabilities to support the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and efforts to halt communism globally.* <sup>36</sup> *Essentially, all the CINCs had all or some of their resources dedicated to halt the spread of communism.* Now that threat is gone, the world is no longer made up of two great military superpowers, it is no longer bipolar. The military the US designed to halt communism was successful, and that threat is gone. It remains to be seen how the US will establish linkage between future threats and our vital interest. Vital interest are articulated in policy, action, and strategy. The reaction to the Soviet threat was to contain Communism and maintain healthy alliances to achieve that containment.

## **MILITARY SPENDING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY**

The collapse of the Soviet Union has caused the focus of US military planners to shift to perceived dangers to vital interest.<sup>57</sup> But the fact remains that the threat for which our armed forces were primarily designed is gone. Potential threats to survival seemed to be focused on internal as well as regional issues. Domestic issues will surely compete for limited resources.<sup>58</sup> But regional threats seem to be the staple for the military of the future. Responding to the crisis in Somalia and what was once Yugoslavia are likely to be the norm, not exceptions of the role of the military services in the future.<sup>59</sup> The military must now plan for the future without the traditional enemy of the last forty years. More importantly, the Cold War ended in total victory for one side and in defeat for the other. This reality cannot be denied despite the understandable sensitivities that such a conclusion provokes among the tenderhearted in the West and some of the former leaders of the defeated side.<sup>60</sup> It will be years before the dust settles but it is already too clear that the transition to stability will be more difficult and prolonged than the democratic reconstruction of either Germany or Japan after 1945.<sup>61</sup>

"The aftermath of the Cold War posed an agenda for the West. That was to make certain that the disintegration of



the Soviet Union becomes the peaceful and enduring end to the Russian empire, and that the collapse of communism truly means the end of the utopian phase in modern political history." <sup>62</sup> These goals will be more possible if the west once again demonstrates strategic staying power and not just vaguely idealistic aims.

After every war our military has faced calls for demobilization.<sup>63</sup> Until World War I vital interest only required that the US maintain a few thousand troops with a cadre of seasoned leaders. Once dangers were handled, the Army would lapse into somnolence. The same can be said for the Navy until the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt. Under Roosevelt the US acquired the Philippines, islands in the Central Pacific, and the Caribbean. This required a Navy, with ships, to protect these interests. It was not until World War II that a large Army, Navy, and Air Force were required to protect our vital interest. When that conflict ended there was massive demobilization. <sup>64</sup> The Soviets, allies during this war, failed to demobilize and in fact stayed at their wartime strength. Because the US had the atomic bomb the Truman administration believed there was no need to maintain a large standing military. So the defense resource allocation process began to return to its prewar importance.

Events were to change Trumans outlook. The Soviet's blockaded Berlin, and then exploded a nuclear device. Truman responded with National Security Policy Paper, NSC

68.<sup>65</sup> It stated that up to 20 percent of our gross national product could go to support the military in its efforts to contain communism. NSC 68 was a document written to fit the times. It elevated the military to the center of our national security in peacetime. It did in fact establish a regime that we had never before enjoyed let alone tolerated, the establishment and maintenance of a large and permanent military establishment in the absence of war.<sup>66</sup>

In restructuring US forces to meet challenges to national security we have chosen to "maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from aspiring to a larger regional or global role".<sup>67</sup> Our current Defense Planning Guidance is based on what is perceived as threats to national security. The DOD Bottom-Up-Review (BUR) put these new dangers into four broad categories: *Dangers posed by nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; regional dangers; dangers to democracy and reform; and economic dangers.*<sup>68</sup> What is realized in the BUR is that the armed forces of the US are central to combating the first two and can play a significant role in meeting the second two. The US is entering a period when resource allocation can no longer be made under conditions of certainty, where the decision maker knows exactly what to expect. In the Cold War the decision makers were fully informed in advance. In the present, the decision makers must deal with conditions of risk and uncertainty. When resource allocations are to be made under conditions of uncertainty

and risk the decision maker may not know what the available resources are, the constraints, or the objectives. Also, under uncertainty, the resource allocator must observe events as they take place and through experience, make inferences about probabilities of future events. These factors lead to certain limitations in the resource allocation process which will apply to the propensity to apply resources. First, the resource allocation process works best under conditions when the threat is known. Second, people are not pessimistic and do not typically take advance action to prepare. Third, people allocate resources at a proportionately higher rate early in time and reduce their allocation as the time continues. Last, people are cognizant of when they need to revise their strategies.<sup>69</sup>

Because the new threat is global it has become ambiguous to many. The irony is that this new threat is still based on the policy of containment. The world has to deal with regional conflicts before they escalate, in other words, contain them.<sup>70</sup> What we neglect is the fact that there were regional conflicts all during the Cold War. True, some of these wars involved client nations supported politically, economically, military, and philosophically by the Soviet party. It has been debated that many of these regional conflicts were held in check by the Soviet Union itself.<sup>71</sup> The Balkins, Moldova and Tajkistan offer some examples of century old hatreds and antagonisms that no longer have their basis in rational behavior.<sup>72</sup>

So there are well defined threats to US vital interest in the evolving world order. General Colin Powell, the former CJCS in an interview in 1992 said: "The US is clearly the leader of the democratic world order. They look to us because they can trust us, because of our democratic political system, which seeks to gain no territory, which seeks not to subjugate anyone else. They look to us because we have the armed forces second to none and we have the ability to use that armed force to deal with political problems that arise in a careful way."<sup>73</sup> So where does this place the US, remembering that we chose our role as a world leader after World War II.

Challenges can only be considered threats if they have the potential to violate our vital interests.<sup>74</sup> To do this they must meet two tests. First, a legitimate national interest is seeing democracy established. Second, the means to assist its sustenance is within our means. If these two conditions are met, then and only then should the US think about involvement.

If, however, the US decides that global leadership during the Cold War was an aberration then disengagement is appropriate. Therefore, with the Cold War over the US should free itself from world issues and establish a policy of disengagement. On the other hand, if a stable and secure world order is in our permanent interest than a strategy of engagement suits our national strengths. It means further that we will apply military force to protect our vital

interest. We have already begun to posture our military forces with the mobility and reach from an insular position to act as that catalyst. Again, it will become the responsibility of the regional CINCs to execute a sound and consistent US national strategy if a stable world order is in our permanent interest.

The US has already entered into several regional conflicts without a well developed military strategy because of a failure to develop a national strategy and this has hampered efforts in these conflicts. If a national strategy is not developed the US cannot translate it into a well defined military strategy and hence operational and tactical strategy. Is the US doomed to tactical failures because of a muddled national strategy?

## WHY A CINC?

The failure of the Gallipoli Campaign in World War I may have been in the inability to translate national strategy into military strategy. But, that failure might have found its roots in the inability to appoint a well informed overall commander who understood the situation. There was no CINC at Gallipoli. There was no well informed commander to provide leadership and with the ability to match the resources, concepts, and plans with sound military strategy.

The overarching national strategy of the Entente powers, (Britain, France, and Russia) in World War I was to use all financial, industrial, and demographic resources to defeat Germany as soon as possible.<sup>75</sup> There was an identifiable threat and there was available resources to allocate to the cause. But there was no one to integrate the military capabilities, there was no one to tailor the force for the Gallipoli Operation.

By comparison, the stated objective of the US in World War II was "unconditional surrender". "Operation Torch", a highly successful campaign in World War II, offers an example of how a clear national strategy successfully directed at a threat can be translated into a military strategy. It also offers a positive example of the interpretability and packaging of forces under a single commander. Torch was based on debated and a well hammered-

out military strategy derived from the national policies of both the US and Britain.<sup>76</sup> This soundness of military strategy in the Torch invasion was then successfully transmitted into operational execution and tactical application. At every stage of Torch, a strategy was first developed to focus on a objective. In the case of the Gallipoli Operation resources were combined because they were available then plans and concepts were used to back into a military strategy. Gallipoli was doomed at every level of strategy from the start, be it military, operational, or tactical, because there was no clear translation of national strategy into military strategy and there was no overall commander of a joint team.

Torch was driven by national strategy and in turn that determined the resources. Gallipoli had resources that were used to determine strategy and strategy cannot be determined by resources alone.<sup>77</sup> Gallipoli found its roots in frustration. In 1914, the British were seeking an alternative strategy to the deadlock on the Western Front in Europe.<sup>78</sup> The deadlock had proven costly to all the belligerents. The casualties were high on both sides and there was no end in sight. The British Prime Minister understood that there was great public disillusionment with the war and some definite victory was needed to shore up public support.<sup>79</sup> Britain had available two formidable uncommitted resources, an idle Navy and colonial reserves.<sup>80</sup>

Britain was also free to maneuver because it was the only belligerent not on the European continent.

This freedom of movement and availability of resources were considerable factors when the British began to search for alternatives to the stalemate on the "Western Front" in August of 1914.<sup>81</sup> There were several, but the use of sea power to strike against the enemy elsewhere immediately became the most popular.<sup>82</sup> A sea-power strike against Germany's ally Turkey in the Dardanelles at Gallipoli was attractive for a variety of presupposed strategic reasons, this included the hopes of involving Greece in the war to assist Serbia against Russia.<sup>83</sup> Of greater importance, an operation through the Dardanelles would reestablish communication with Russia and open access to the Black Sea and eventually open the Danube in Austria.<sup>84</sup> The British, in planning the campaign in isolation from the other members of the Entente, were remiss in their interpretations of available resources. True there were ships available, but they were obsolete; true there was manpower available in Egypt that could be used elsewhere, but there was little ammunition, artillery, and leadership to support that manpower.<sup>85</sup>

By comparison Operation Torch, in the initial stages of preparation, is quite different. It was an agreed upon strategic objective, although heavily debated, between the US and Britain in the Acadia Conference.<sup>86</sup> The irony of comparing Torch to Gallipoli Campaign is that both were



developed for the same reasons: a need to assist Russia; form a diversionary front; and the inability to assault Germany in a major face-to-face confrontation.<sup>87</sup> What also makes Torch and Gallipoli similar is the opposing forces in both assault campaigns, were secondary belligerents, in Gallipoli the Turkish and in Torch the Vichy French.<sup>88</sup>

Torch had strong roots at the national and military transference level Gallipoli did not.<sup>89</sup> The foresight in joint/combined planning allowed US and Britain's strategy to be transmitted into the nucleus of a sound military strategy. This transmission was absent in the Gallipoli Campaign.<sup>90</sup>

Torch found its conceptional roots in 1938 when national attention in the US shifted to the possibility that Europe could be the site of the next war. Realizing this, the US came up with the Rainbow Plans, five in all, each based on a different scenario.<sup>91</sup> These plans/concepts stated that the broad objectives of the US and their allies France and Britain, would be concentrated against Germany, Italy and Japan. These plans and later negotiations provided the basis for offensive operations, first with Germany and concurrent defensive operations against Japan.<sup>92</sup> This foresight in planning allowed US and British national strategy to be transmitted into the nucleus of a sound military strategy. This transmission of national strategy to military strategy or long range planning as we would call it today was absent in the Gallipoli Campaign.<sup>93</sup> Further

the planners of Torch took into consideration resources and applied them to plans and concepts already developed from operational strategy. Torch planners did not allow resources to determine strategy. The final decision to invade Africa instead of Europe, in a full scale cross-channel invasion, may have been influenced by political motives and against the advise of President Roosevelt's military advisors.<sup>94</sup> But, more importantly it was the lack of sufficient and capable landing craft for a European invasion on the shores of France that provided the military logic.<sup>95</sup>

Plan Bolero, the build up of forces in England, had been written by the US, concurrently with the planning for the invasion of Europe across the English Channel in 1943. Operation Roundup, <sup>96</sup> the logistical plan to support Bolero lacked the required mass production of landing craft to execute the operation.<sup>97</sup> Torch, however, required fewer of these resources.<sup>98</sup> Roosevelt saw the opportunity to coalesce several factors and execute a sound offensive in Africa. Because of public opinion, the possible collapse of Russia, the British alliance, the lack of offensive capability in the Pacific, the inability to proceed with the invasion of Europe, and the chance to gain assistance from the Free French in North Africa, Torch presented a sound operational target.<sup>99</sup>

There was never a point in the Gallipoli campaign when the planners transferred national strategy into military

strategy. "Strategy instead of being the servant of policy became the master, a blind and brutal master"<sup>100</sup> This ill fated military strategy fell into operational strategy that was never clear. Was the assault on Gallipoli to be purely a naval operation, or an amphibious assault, or a military operation supported by the Navy?<sup>101</sup> The resources in Torch were used because they were available and appropriate. In Gallipoli there were resources available but were they appropriate? Finally, on the level of operational execution at Gallipoli there was no understanding and concurrence of the theater of operations commander, there was no CINC, there was a Navy and Army Commander along with forces from other nations. In the case of Torch, General Eisenhower, the commanding officer in charge of the campaign, was among the initial planners of Operation Roundup.<sup>102</sup> In Gallipoli, the land commander was a last minute ill-advised walk on,<sup>103</sup> who had no part in the planning of the invasion.<sup>104</sup>

The lack of clear-cut strategic planning ran through the national, military, and operational levels and served to compound the inevitable failure at Gallipoli. At Gallipoli it was only after a naval attack failed that an amphibious operation was undertaken and then with great confusion. In contrast Torch was the result of significant planning and conceptualization at the higher levels. Both Torch and Gallipoli consisted of three separate assault forces conducting amphibious landings at three sites.<sup>105</sup> There is no doubt that parts of the Gallipoli invasion force met

with little or no opposition and they could have exploited the situation and probably achieved victory. But this did not happen, because once again those on the beach faced poorly defined strategy compounded by nonexistent plans and concepts. But, most importantly there was no leadership for combined operations and harmony between the different fighting disciplines.<sup>106</sup>

The English drifted into the Gallipoli campaign more as a demonstration than a strategic objective. The campaign consisted of poorly prepared, organized, and led naval assault on the Straits,<sup>107</sup> which evolved into a land campaign to assist the Navy, into a land campaign assisted by the Navy, and finally evacuation.<sup>108</sup> The British government failed to discern the eventually extent of the involvement as a consequence of the lack of the preparation at all levels. They were doomed for failure because they had no one person who understood the threat, the strategic objective, the operational campaign, and the use of combined forces. The clear choice for tactical failure was made at the initial stages. In retrospect there should have either been no Gallipoli at all or an appropriate leader should have been selected and issued the proper resources. Once he was given the accompanying plans and concepts he could have made sure they were exercised at the national, military, operational and tactical levels.<sup>109</sup>

As it was strategically laid out, Torch successfully completed the first step in recovering North Africa from

Axis control.<sup>110</sup> Unlike Gallipoli it can be classified as a decisive battle with a positive impact on the Allied war effort. Gallipoli can also be classified as a decisive battle in World War I, but for the opposite reason. Torch was planned at the strategic military level to accomplish decisive objects. Gallipoli was never planned out and is infamous for the decisive objectives it did not accomplish.<sup>111</sup>

The allied personnel matured as a result of the experience gained in Torch. Eisenhower's headquarters survived and grew even after initial disappointments, frustration, and recriminations, they were molded into an effective and efficient joint staff.<sup>112</sup> Such was not the case for the military at Gallipoli where they were either relieved, retired, or forced out.<sup>113</sup> Furthermore, nothing of value was accomplished by the effort and there is still great resentment in many circles over the campaign. It was the success of Torch that signaled the turning point in favor of the allies.<sup>114</sup> After Torch the Axis powers lost the initiative and passed onto the strategic defense. The effects of detailed planning in Operation Torch flowed smoothly because of the clearly stated national and military strategies of the US and Britain under sound leadership.<sup>115</sup> It was critical to the success of Torch that the right leader be chosen, and again the proper resources to support the operation.

Both Torch and Gallipoli signaled turning points in their respective wars. In the case of Torch it was favorable, in the case of Gallipoli it signaled the end to peripheral campaigns and locked the combatants in the slaughter on the Western Front. Hitler never gained the initiative after Torch.<sup>116</sup> In Africa the allies won not only territory of strategic worth but inflicted losses on the Axis power as to the ability and perhaps the will to fight.<sup>117</sup> North Africa was not itself a mortal blow to the enemy, but it was a decisive blow, which marked a turning point. Henceforth, the Axis remained on the defensive as the resources to wage war became increasingly scarce. Gallipoli may stand alone as the antithesis of a successful campaign,<sup>118</sup> not for what it accomplished but for what it could have accomplished: the opening of a second front: the release of pressure from the stalemate on the Western Front, the assistance of the previously uncommitted allies; and lastly it could have shored up a Russian government which may in of itself have shortened the war.<sup>119</sup>

General Eisenhower, the Torch theater commander or CINC, had a clearly defined threat, articulated through specific national strategy. He submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the "Outline Plan Operation Torch" based on this clarity. This plan was tentative and established forces required. The preparation of a theater outline in peacetime has now become the CINCs process to convert to campaign plans during a crisis or conflict.<sup>120</sup> From this

plan the CINC derives what he needs to bring to the Joint Strategic Planning System for the defense resource allocation system. It is further the basis for development of the CINC's Integrated Logistics Plan and identification of warstoppers. As it can be seen the need for an operational CINC was understood long before the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

## CONCLUSION

Examination of the role of the CINCs in the Defense Resource Allocation Process requires the breaking down of that process into palatable subjects or sub-processes. Among these is the BPPBS, the programmatic system used to determine what resources are required to dedicate or aim at the threat. It is becoming more evident in the last two years that threat is not so easily defined. For the past forty seven years we have had a constant threat, the Soviet Union and its stated objective to overthrow capitalism. This created a global polarity unequalled in history. Polarity is gone or at least it is perceived as gone, no longer dangerous. What is now absent in the stated objectives is the old themes of global transformation to communism and the defeat of the capitalistic system, *they are no longer a threat*. The Soviets are no longer interested in promulgating their political philosophy throughout the world. Their survival as ours is concerned more with domestic turmoil, in many cases the issues are exactly the same, high unemployment, crime, drugs, and the impact of dismantling a large military industrial complex. Our reciprocal national strategies clearly drove our military strategy. Where the US outdistanced the USSR is with the foresight to realize that a military is only the servant of the people, not the master.



Now there is no need to focus on the Soviet Union. There are many other dangers that have become threats. Is the US developing a clean crisp national strategy to focus on these threats? Is there a parallel to the paradigm of "containment" that was used so effectively against the Soviets? If so, there is a need to focus on threat analysis and make sure the US doesn't drift into conflicts without end. Once the threat is defined and the US has ascertained national security strategy it can begin to compliment this with sound military strategy.

Without clear national strategy the US is doomed to endless struggles at greater and greater cost to our nation. We will deplete our resources like the Soviets did and achieve nothing. The Soviets failed because they dedicated their entire national resources to the spread of communism. To face the threats of today and tomorrow the US must have a sound military strategy regardless of the preponderance of resources.<sup>121</sup> The British at Gallipoli had reserves of resources and they had a sound national strategy. But they could not come up with the vehicle to transition that national strategy into a military strategy, they had no CINC to package and employ the forces. Once we know where our national strategy is taking us we can begin to develop military strategy.<sup>122</sup> We may find large military campaigns are no longer in order, that there are other alternatives.<sup>123</sup> The US has already decided that it will address regional dangers while routinely employing joint force packages that

are operationally effective, resource efficient, and are able to integrate with capabilities of other government agencies and other nation's armed forces.<sup>124</sup> Whatever role we are given, we do not want the wrong resource because they are available.<sup>125</sup>

The military can help define the resource allocation process through the use of the BPPBS once it is told where we are going. "As the US reshapes and downsizes its forces for the future, the central goal continues to be support for our CINCs in the field. Our future focus will not be on the number of ships, squadron, or battalions. The abilities of these force structures or groupings of capabilities - traditionally seen as a measure of readiness - fail to tell the whole story. Rather readiness is likely to be measured by our ability to package and employ needed capabilities across the full spectrum of defined operations. This is why the emphasis should be placed on capabilities and tasks of the CINCs."<sup>126</sup> (fig 3)

Recent articles have declared the Marine Corps a winner in the SECDEF Aspin's Bottom-Up-Review, citing his decision to minimize reductions to the Marine Corps compared to those being levied on the other services. Declaring a victor in the so called "budget wars" of Washington obscures the expense of ongoing military restructuring. Rather than concentrating on reductions, the real decision should be on capabilities. While discarding obsolescent force structure, each service has

preserved and in some cases enhanced, its ability to respond to regional crisis.<sup>127</sup>

As the defense budget shrinks, greater efficiencies will be required of the services. The development of joint integrated strike forces would be a logical outgrowth of the increasing level of joint experiences and the requirements for mobile, powerful forces capable of responding rapidly around the world. A joint integrated strike force concept containing the best elements of sea and air power with land power would be a powerful evocation of US resolve and capabilities to maintain a stable peaceful world.<sup>128</sup>

(fig 3)

The constant thread running through the defense resource allocation process, from the BPPBS, the JSPS to the campaign plans is the importance of the CINCs. The CINCs role has become apparent even to Congress. The CINC is the one who will synchronize efforts from start to finish, from planning to execution in the theater. All theater efforts of warfare the land, air, and space will be controlled by his establishment of command relationships, description of operations, task assignment and force organization.<sup>129</sup> As the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Merrill McPeak stated about Operation DESERT STORM "It is important that we should have one concept of operations -- General Schwarzkof's concept -- for the air, land, and sea campaign."<sup>130</sup> Now is not the time for service turf battles in the defense resource allocation process. In operational

matters, the Goldwater-Nichols Bill did little to help resource allocation . According to one observer resource allocation is what the services do 90 percent of the time. We expected the Joint Staff to put together resource requirements from the CINCs and compare the list to the service POMs. The Chairman does not have the power to modify service POMs: however, he can use his position to recommend changes to the Secretary of Defense. That has not happened, it is the name of the game in peacetime. I think it is time we went to a single Joint POM."<sup>131</sup>

Arthur Hadley in his book The Straw Giant, writes: "At present the Services rather than the CINCs plan the structure of the theater forces and keep a large measure of control over the supplies the CINC can use. (This exclusion of the CINCs from defense planning has grown out of service fears of being dominated by a rival service)".<sup>132</sup> If Mr. Hadley is correct then there is room for improvement.

Conversely, when Admiral Crowe was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1989 he stated in reference to the success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act: "This overall process works well to ensure that priority CINC requirements are deliberated at the highest level of decision making within the Defense Department throughout the Programming and Budget phases. My consultations with the combatant commanders indicate that their needs are being served and modifications to the existing process is not necessary."<sup>133</sup>

# Adaptive Joint Force Planning




Figure 3



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